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A B S T R A C T
Triggered by an increased awareness of the possible effects of climate change, many deltaic regions around the world
are undertaking planning initiatives to address the problems they expect to face in the future. Dutch delta planning
knowledge and expertise figure prominently in some of these initiatives. We use this article to ask why this is so. What
makes Dutch delta knowledge special, and how does it become generic enough to travel to other places? The perti-
nence of these questions stems from the realization that deltas do not pre-exist human interventions, but are as much
the effect of different planning cultures, trajectories and objectives, as they are their cause. Through a discussion of
some telling anecdotes of delta planning, our analysis shows that while the Dutchness of delta planning expertise is a
powerful branding, this expertise can only travel through a conscious and simultaneous process of un-Dutching: by
packaging and scientizing Dutch Delta planning to turn it into a more generic Adaptive Delta Management approach.
1. Introduction deltas as decentered objects
The Dutch Have Solutions to Rising Seas. The World Is Watching. This
headline taken from the New York Times1 is illustrative of a wave of Dutch
experts traveling the world, among others to a number of South and
Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Bangladesh, Myanmar). The justifi-
cation of this involvement is the idea that other countries can learn from
the Dutch Delta approach, an approach that is captured in a methodology
called Adaptive Delta management. Distilled from experiences with delta
planning activities in the Netherlands (see e.g. Zevenbergen et al., 2013),
the methodology is explained and summarized in a brochure called “The
Delta Approach”, published by the Dutch government. The brochure
identifies “12 building blocks for a delta approach,” as “the ‘must-haves’
for sustainable delta management”. Through the methodology, Dutch ex-
periences with their own delta thus come to serve as the basis for a generic
model of delta planning more widely.
But what is so special about Dutch delta knowledge? What is it that
makes this purportedly very Dutch knowledge generic enough to
travel? Doubts about the existence of intrinsic and natural delta features
that can serve as the anchor and justification for deltas to be compared
and delta knowledges to travel form the background to these questions.
By exploring the possible tension between the Dutch-ness of delta
planning expertise on the one hand and its global mobility on the other,
we use this paper to open up Dutch delta knowledges and their travels
for questioning. Doing this, we hope, provides inspiration for exchanges
of experiences between delta countries and their experts that are more
symmetrical in not relying on the assumed superiority of the Dutch and
more modest in avoiding grand theorizations or generalizations.
1.1. Dancing deltas
Scholars from a variety of backgrounds have invoked terms such as
“policy mobility” (Cook and Ward, 2012), “policy diffusion” (Radaelli,
2005), the travel of ideas (Mukhtarov, 2014) or knowledge transfer
(Zevenbergen et al., 2013) to understand how policy ideas can move
from one place to another. These terms have in common that they con-
ceptualize policies and the forms of expertise that accompany or justify
them as relatively stable entities, a stability that often is anchored in the
sameness of their object(s) of planning, policy or knowledge. In this way,
the exportability and mobility of policies and knowledges can be ex-
plained by the similarity of the objects that they relate to.
Doubts about the validity of this assumption of similarity form the
starting point of this paper. We have reasons to question whether dif-
ferent deltas are similar enough to warrant or justify comparable delta
knowledge or planning procedures. Our replacement of a con-
ceptualization of deltas as ‘natural’ places can be objectively char-
acterized with one that defines deltas as always intrinsically socio-
natural informs this. Here, we take inspiration from Norgaard et al.
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(2009). They mobilize the idea of co-evolution to characterize the Ca-
lifornia Delta as consisting of ever-changing, unruly and often in-
explicable interactions between discourses (visions, policies, science),
materials (lands and waters; infrastructures) and institutions. Their
portrayal of historical changes in the Delta highlights “how Delta eco-
logical processes change and how the way scientists at different times
have bounded problems and focused on some interactions out of the
immense complexity of the Delta, while ignoring others, is intertwined
with governance objectives and past and intended transformations of
the environment” (Norgaard et al., 2009: 645). Important here is that in
a co-evolutionary understanding, science and governance are part of (or
endogenous to) a processes of change. As the article concludes: “there is
no environmental reality over time, or the possibility of one in the fu-
ture, that is independent of how people both understand and affect the
environment through governance, or its absence” (Norgaard et al.,
2009: 651).
While the concept of co-evolution originates in evolutionary biology,
much theorizing in anthropology and sociology that regards change as
consisting of mutual interactions and continuous feed-back loops be-
tween various elements or systems can also be seen as subscribing to
some principle of co-evolution. The idea of co-evolution is particularly
well suited for understanding and dealing with complex and dynamic
socioecological systems, such as deltas (also see Gerrits, 2008), char-
acterized by high levels of uncertainty, a diversity of competing values
and decision stakes and a multitude of interest groups who may have
different world views and different frames for understanding the pro-
blem. It is telling in this respect that the environmental historian Biggs
(2011), without explicitly referring to the term co-evolution, aptly
characterized delta developments in the Mekong delta in Vietnam with
the term quagmire, a terms that refers both to “a soft boggy area of land
that gives way underfoot” and to “an awkward, complex, or hazardous
situation” (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/quagmire).
The implication of a co-evolutionary definition of a delta is that
deltaic environments do not pre-exist human interventions, but come
into being and are made through them. They are “concretely made,
conjoined or transformed by the co-evolving relations of multiple
agents; people, technologies, materials, spirits, ideas – or what you
have” (Jensen and Morita, 2015, p. 82). The continuously in-the-
making-ness of deltas is a process that can be grasped, following
Pickering (2008), as a dance between humans and material agency.
Deltas continuously change shape because of how people intervene in
their mingling of lands and waters, and of how lands and waters in turn
respond to such interventions, sometimes in surprising and contingent
ways, to again provoke reactions from people. Past institutional ar-
rangements, built landscapes and technologies importantly co-shape
the options available to make changes or plan new interventions (see
Biggs et al., 2009; Gerrits, 2008; Norgaard et al., 2009).
In the rest of the paper, we present selected episodes of Dutch delta
planning in the Netherlands and elsewhere (Vietnam and Bangladesh)
to show that it makes sense to define and characterize deltas in co-
evolutionary terms, as ever-changing and always-in-the making pro-
cesses that are importantly shaped by history. In particular, we use
descriptions of how Dutch delta planning activities have transformed
since the 1950s to illustrate that any characterization or definition of a
delta (or the Dutch delta) is situated and relational; these character-
izations and definitions are endogenous to the processes of change and
intervention of which they formed part. If one accepts that a delta and
its knowledge are dynamic as well as interdependent, the question of
the transferability of Dutch delta planning knowledge to other countries
poses itself. What is it that the Dutch hope to transfer to other coun-
tries? We examine delta planning processes taking place in the Mekong
delta in Vietnam and the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta in
Bangladesh to try answering this question. We use our findings to
conclude with an interrogation of the notions of deltaic sameness and
Dutchness that underpin and justify delta planning processes in the
Netherlands, Bangladesh and Vietnam.
1.2. Methodology
Our analysis draws on auto-ethnographic and participatory ob-
servations carried out since the 2008 publication of the second Dutch
Delta committee (Delta Commissie, 2008). This material has been sup-
plemented by five in-depth interviews and an analysis of the written
material produced by the Delta plan initiatives in the Netherlands,
Vietnam, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The first author's (AZ) observations
trace the courses of action following the publication of the second Delta
committee, particularly the establishment of a national Delta Programme
(Zegwaard et al., 2015). In the Netherlands, we carried out observations
during visits to annual conferences organized by the Dutch Delta pro-
gramme and during one of their so-called “knowledge-conferences”.
After having done its work in the Netherlands, the Veerman committee
traveled to Vietnam where it participated in the formulation of the Me-
kong Delta plan. AZ attended one of the Mekong delta plan workshops in
April 2013. This was one among many occasions in which members of
the Dutch delegation met with their Vietnamese counterparts to discuss a
draft version of the plan. Aside from this material, the chapter is also
informed by the observations and experiences of GvH, who was one of
the Dutch experts involved in formulating the Mekong Delta Plan.
Our analysis also draws on a workshop that we organized in June
2018 to test and discuss some of our initial findings with several actors
who are involved in delta planning processes and their travels. In this
workshop we facilitated a dialog between Dutch delta planning experts,
government representatives and invited speakers from places ‘affected’
by Dutch masterplans in various places in the world. In this workshop
we coined the central question “What is it that Dutch Delta and
Masterplans do? What are intended and unintended outcomes?”2
2. From seas to rivers
In the Netherlands, national-level delta planning began in earnest in
the 1950s. Of course, the Dutch had already been actively making and
protecting their land for centuries. Yet, it was only in 1953, after the
Netherlands was hit by a large-scale flooding disaster that a concerted
effort at the national level was made to deal more effectively with flood
risks. This happened through the establishment of the first Delta
Committee. The committee was assigned the task of determining
“which hydraulic engineering works should be undertaken in relation
to those areas ravaged by the storm surge, (and) also to consider
whether closure of the sea inlets should form one of these works” (Delta
Committee 1, 1961: 15, translation from Delta Committee 2, 2008). The
resulting plan proposed full closure of almost all open river connections
to the sea, as well as the heightening of existing sea protection infra-
structures (e.g. dikes) to what became known as the ‘Delta Height’.
Although the plans were subsequently modified (Bijker, 2002), these
constructions radically altered the outline of the Dutch coast.
High-water levels in the rivers Rhine and Meuse (in 1993 and 1995)
reminded the Dutch that flood dangers do not just come from the sea, and
prompted the central government to initiate a “delta plan for large rivers”.
In contrast to the delta in the first delta plan, which is one that consists of
the lands that are at risk from being flooded from the sea, in this Delta Plan
the delta has become the lands that might be flooded by rivers.
Ten years later yet a third delta made its appearance through the
establishment of the second delta committee. This time, the reason for
having the committee was not a (near) flooding event in the country.
Rather, the committee was a response to a growing awareness of cli-
mate change in conjunction with a flood that happened elsewhere: the
New Orleans flooding in 2005 (Shrum, 2007). The task of the 2008
committee was to find an answer the question of how to “ensure that
future generations will continue to find our country an attractive place
2 See https://flows.hypotheses.org/1483 and https://flows.hypotheses.org/
1511.
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in which to live and work, to invest in and take their leisure?” (Delta
Committee 2, 2008: 7).
Table 1 illustrates the differences between the objectives of the first
and second Dutch Delta committees. As compared to the first, which
focused narrowly on civil engineering, the second Committee's em-
phasis on future generations and an attractive place to live sounds almost
esoteric. To operationalize this grand vision, the second committee
evolved into a nation-wide Delta Programme, concerned with flooding
and the safety of the Netherlands (Boezeman et al., 2013; Verduijn
et al., 2012). Its objectives were:
to ensure sustainable and robust flood risk management and fresh-
water supplies in 2050, which will allow our country to withstand the
(greater) climatic extremes in a resilient manner. In this way, the
considerably increased economic values and the higher number of
people are well protected. We will ensure that the Netherlands is
prepared for various scenarios. We will choose strategies and mea-
sures that can give us flexibility in the way we respond to new
measurements and insights, by stepping up our efforts if necessary or
changing strategy. Everything is at hand. (Deltaprogramma, 2014: 6)
Whereas the resulting planning process was not very different from
that proposed by the 1960s delta committee, what did change was the
spatial definition of the Dutch delta. For the first Delta committee, the
delta consisted of the southwest of the Netherlands, the provinces of
Zeeland and Zuid-Holland, the areas that had been affected by the
storm surge. In the 2000s plans, however, the delta had expanded to
cover the entire country.
2.1. Translating historical events into norms
Conventionally in the Netherlands, the case for the urgency of delta
problems, and the corresponding need for specific techno-scientific
expertise, is made through statistical analyses of past events. Largely
hidden in the everyday practices of the Dutch water management
community sits a sophisticated, historically evolved system for asses-
sing, mapping and quantifying delta ‘nature’ in order to make it legible
to managers and policymakers. Testifying to the existence of this
system, an interviewee explained how the high water levels that almost
flooded large parts of the Netherlands in 1993 and 1995 changed the
norms of protection along the river Rhine. “Nature started to mess with
the statistics,” a point that the interviewee illustrated by drawing a
figure. In a mini lecture on Dutch dike engineering, he explained that
the river Rhine and Meuse each have their own statistical graphs. These
graphs are used for deriving probabilities of water levels and are then
used for determining the heights of dikes. After the 1993 and 1995
events, the linear line was moved up thereby changing the water level
norms. The reasons for this change were institutional and practical. If
the government had stuck to the statistical approach used to establish
safe water levels until 1995, a significant heightening of the dikes
would have been required. It would have been very difficult, if not
impossible, to mobilize the enormous investments needed to do this.
Instead of heightening the dikes, the responsible committee thus
changed the equation that connected the plotted events.
The incident dented the dike engineer's trust in science-based rational
decision making. Apparently, the scientific methods defined by the first
delta committee for determining the layout and height of dikes were not
as fixed as generally portrayed3 or perhaps as Rijkswaterstaat would like
the general audience to believe. These methods come about through
negotiations and tinkering, and are influenced by political choices.
2.2. From protecting land to creating nature
Not just the mathematics behind dikes changed, but also the very
idea of what a dike is or should be changed over time. This importantly
happened through the depoldering ‘movements’ that emerged in the
period between the first and second delta committee. Depoldering is an
exponent of the so-called ‘eco-turn’ in Dutch water management (see
Disco, 2002).
The first delta committee was put in place to protect the lands that
were damaged by the 1953 storm surge. Most of these lands were
poldered areas. A polder, one of the icons of Dutch water management,
“is a level area which was originally subject to a high water-level, either
permanently or seasonally and due to either ground- water or surface
water. It becomes a polder when it is separated from the surrounding
hydrological regime so that its water-level can be controlled in-
dependently of the surrounding regime” (Segeren, 1983, p. 51). Pol-
dering thus turns low lying swampy wetlands into dry lands that are
suitable for humans to live in. The main philosophy guiding the first
delta committee was a polder philosophy: it proposed the creation of
separations between hydrological regimes through the construction of
hydraulic engineering works: heightened dikes and closure dams.
Ecologists and environmentalists started questioning the wisdom of the
polder philosophy toward the end of the 20th century, among others because
closing off portions of land from surrounding hydrological (tidal) regimes
caused sometimes irreversible changes in ecosystems, also destroying bio-
diversity. One (in)famous example of resulting proposals to bring back
nature in was the plan to de-polder the Hertogin Hedwiges polder, located
on the border between the Netherlands and Belgium, on the shores of the
Western Scheldt estuary. In 1995, the Netherlands and Belgium had agreed
to turn this agricultural polder land into an intertidal nature area. This al-
lowance for ‘nature’ – in the form of tidal flows – to again take its course
through the removal of dikes was a political gesture to compensate for the
damage done by the deepening of the Western Scheldt, to enable large
container ships to enter the harbor of Antwerp in Belgium (Drenthen, 2013).
The depoldering of the Dutch part of the polder was strongly opposed by
people living in the south western parts of the Netherlands.
Similar depoldering interventions happened in other polders in the
country – most notably along the major rivers Rhine and Meuse – with
agricultural lands having to make way for watery nature. These initiatives
mark a distinct change in Dutch diking strategies, with the conventional
impulse to achieve flood protection by a gradual heightening of the dikes
being replaced by plans to allow rivers to occasionally flood.
2.3. Future making and delta planning: apocalypse now?
Another significant difference between the first and the second delta
committee lies in their approach to possible futures. As described, the
Table 1
Delta planning episodes in the Netherlands and their objectives.
Year Plan/process Goal/objective
1961 Delta Committee To assess “which hydraulic engineering works should be undertaken in relation to those areas ravaged by the storm surge, (and) also to consider
whether closure of the sea inlets should form one of these works” (Delta Committee, 1961, p. 15)
2008 Delta Committee “How can we ensure that future generations will continue to find our country an attractive place in which to live and work, to invest and take
their leisure?” (Delta Committee, 2008, p. 7)
2009–2015 Delta Programme “to protect the Netherlands from flooding and to secure a sufficient supply of freshwater for the generations ahead.”
3 Or to translate this into the painters introduced by Pickering (2008) to il-
lustrated two different ontological stances, the methods behind the construction
of the dikes are not as Mondrianesque as they appear.
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first delta committee predicted the probability of future events on the
basis of on an extrapolation of what had happened in the past. The
second committee supplemented this probability thinking with sce-
nario-thinking.
Through scenario thinking, the second Delta Committee introduced a
new future generating practice. This practice has become known under
the label of Adaptive Delta Management. In the Delta Programme's
version of adaptive delta management, “adaptation tracks” play a crucial
role. These are strategies (e.g. policies or infrastructural changes) that are
formulated on the basis of delta scenarios. The Delta Programme dis-
tinguishes four delta scenarios, using different combinations of climate
change and socio-economic development as their axes of differentiation
(see Fig. 1) for formulating adaptation tracks.
2.4. The Dutch delta
In this section, we have examined how deltas came into being in the
Netherlands through a form of co-evolution between delta science, Dutch
delta planning and lands and waters. We focused on some of the practices
that the delta consists of, and the methods used to establish it as an un-
certain object in need of development or protection. Our comparison of
different delta episodes revealed that through changing planning and in-
tervention practices, the delta itself also changed and evolved. The
stretching of the Dutch delta that occurred between the first and second
delta committees is therefore more than a spatial expansion. It also is a shift
in emphasis from just floods caused by the sea to also considering river
floods, and refers to changing water level norms. The stretch of the delta
furthermore embodies a different flood protection philosophy, manifested
in changing ideas about what dikes and polders are or should be. Where the
engineering works proposed by the first delta committee had the objective
of firmly separating the poldered lands from unwanted water to protect
people and farmlands, the second delta committee adopted a more am-
phibious philosophy in allowing for and even stimulating interactions be-
tween water and land, or between polder and non-polder areas. This is an
ecological turn, but also reflects an emerging acknowledgment that floods
are difficult to fully comprehend and control: it is in this sense an
acceptance of the limits of science and engineering's capacities. The new
delta approach involves managed interactions between poldered and non
poldered areas, the coordinates of which are provided by adaptation tracks
that are in turn informed by future scenarios. These future scenarios,
through which global ‘phenomena’ like climate change enter the
Netherlands, make room for and indeed help bring into being a delta that
covers the entire Netherlands. The comparison of different delta planning
episodes thus reveals that though in all episodes planners were concerned
with a seemingly similar set of flooding problems, the contours and co-
ordinates of these problems changed considerably as a consequence of past
interventions and because of new insights – as did the delta. How then is it
possible to talk of a Dutch Delta planning approach?
In the following section, we explore what happened when the Dutch
delta planning approach began traveling to some Asian countries,
countries with quite different physical, cultural and political settings.
Here we are particularly interested in exploring how ‘sameness’ (similar
deltas and delta planning approaches) co-existed with ‘difference’
(Dutchness, or other contextualizations).
3. Dutch delta planning elsewhere
As noted in the introduction, brochures like “The Delta Approach”
suggest the existence of a sophisticated delta planning package that
evolved through systematic and gradual learning in the Netherlands.
The natural or ecological sameness of deltas is what feeds the belief that
this advanced planning approach is usable in and useful for other deltas
across the world. When we asked a Dutch project leader of an Asian
delta planning project what exactly was being exported from the
Netherlands, the answer was less straightforward: “I always think the
content of this export is paper-thin. […] This includes mainly thinking
toward the future, about how these might contain various sorts of fu-
tures; and talk to lots and lots of different stakeholders” (Interview G, 18
march 2015). By comparing what is done and understood as the delta
approach in different places in the world, it becomes apparent that
there are different manifestations or versions of it (see Table 2, see also
Seijger et al., 2016).
Fig. 1. Delta scenarios as developed and used by the delta programma (see e.g. Deltaprogramma, 2012).
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Referring to these different processes as being part of the ‘Dutch
Delta Approach’ is therefore above all a way to facilitate the export of
Dutch water expertise to other countries:
the Delta Programme approach has already become an export pro-
duct itself: the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ is drawing considerable at-
tention around the globe. Various countries have called in the assis-
tance of the Dutch government and business community to apply the
Delta Programme approach to their own tasking (Deltaprogramma,
2014: 8).
The head of the second Delta Committee, who is keen to emphasize
such exportability explained in an interview:
Let us say that in terms of process, we have invented something. How
to organize such a process. In that sense a Delta plan is an export
product. We are asked to come and do the same thing in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh is a democracy, this is quite something different [from
Vietnam], a lot more poverty, a different governance culture.
Completely different. The art is, like we did in the Netherlands, to
create a structure, to de-politicize the problem. It doesn’t matter
whether you are left or right wing, you’ll drown if you don’t take
measures. It's about urgency and modality, but eventually a governor
will have to face this problem. In that sense it's an export product, a
unique approach (Interview C, 25 January 2013).
In this explanation, making the delta into an object of planning thus
means establishing a decision-making sphere that is screened off from
normal political procedures and structures.
3.1. Presence and absence in sketching alternative futures
As one interviewee insisted, thinking toward the future forms a crucial
element of current delta planning exercises, which all importantly
consist of attempts to bring a number of key actors together to jointly
determine the delta agenda: the topics or themes that need to be dealt
with in these deltas. Some kind of delta-specificity needs to be present
to justify specific delta planning expertise. In this section, we unravel
what this specificity is by having a closer look at this process of for-
mulating futures, zooming in on how preferred futures favor certain
developments – ways of dealing with the interactions between land and
water – while expunging others, or by marking certain developments as
“autonomous” and others as “in need of intervention.” What do the
deltas that emerge in these futures look like?
On the face of it, the various delta planning initiatives in the
Netherlands, Vietnam and Bangladesh appear like ‘package-deals’,
consisting of a combination of specific delta planning methodologies. In
the case of the Dutch Delta, the directions to be taken and the languages
used to characterize futures were strongly determined by the assign-
ment given by the minister. One member of the 2008 Delta Committee
explained how this assignment set the boundaries of the planning object
– the delta – and relates how they were able to stretch these boundaries:
“our original assignment was to focus on the layout of our coast, in
relation to climate change. That was our assignment. When we came
together for the first time, already after say two hours it became clear
that we had to look at the water system as a whole” (Interview E, 19
February 2015). With the object now expanded to “the entire water
system,” a deliberate choice was made to look at a ‘maximum scenario’,
because: “if a government wants to protect its citizens, it at least needs
to know the worst case scenario” (Interview C, 25 January 2013). This
maximum scenario included estimates of the magnitude of future sea
level rise and changes in river discharge.
The worst-case scenario was designed “to see if we can at all
maintain living in the Netherlands, which is the crucial question”
(Interview E, 19 February 2015). Afterwards, climate scientists were
asked to: “put something in [to your models] that is unfavorable, but
that you still think of as realistic” (Interview E, 19 February 2015).
Science thus served political function, with climate scientists judging
whether projections were sufficiently ‘realistic.’ The Delta Programme
attempted to somehow contain future uncertainties (Zegwaard et al.,
2015) by developing a systematic set of tools and concepts that became
the methodology referred to as “Adaptive Delta management.”
In the Dutch case, this methodology emerged more or less con-
tingently on the basis of societal and scientific insights, political pre-
ferences and alliances of those who happened to be involved in de-
veloping it. To turn it into a program that could be exported to other
deltas, most notably the Bangladesh Delta plan, this process had to
somehow be ‘fixed’ to make it seem more ‘scientific,’ systematic and
objective. One manifestation of this attempt at fixation is an Adaptive
Delta Management brochure, published by the Dutch firm Deltares. This
brochure4 introduces Adaptive Delta Management, and explains why it
is different and better than conventional ‘policy analysis’ approaches.
Interestingly, the text makes no references to a Dutch context. Another
manifestation of a fixing attempt is a study that was published around
the same time by the Delta Alliance, a Dutch initiated global delta
knowledge sharing network. This study tries to provide Adaptive Delta
Management with a scientific grounding,5 which is a proven tactic of
making it (seem) generic and universally applicable.
The application of this delta planning methodology in Bangladesh
was explained by one of the experts involved:
“Eventually, this was unclear for a long time, but they now really
want to apply an Adaptive Delta Management format [in Bangladesh].
Which means, the classic – well, there is not really a classic…. It
means a setup with a bunch of scenarios, a so called delta vision, an
assessment framework, some strategies, which lead to adaptation
tipping points, adaptation pathways, and from there a robust and
flexible plan. A strategy for the long term for the entire water
management.” (Interview F, 5 March 2015)
Table 2
Deltas planning and studies in other deltas and their objectives.
2013 Mekong, Vietnam Delta Plan “to contribute to realising and maintaining a prosperous delta, both economically and socially, in which its
population can thrive in a vigorous and dynamic economy that is founded on sustainable use of its natural
resources, and well adapted to changes in water resources and climate”
2014 Ayeyarwady, Myanmar IWRM strategic
study
“This study is at a strategic level; it presents an overview of the most important challenges and anticipated
changes in water resources management, what measures could be taken and the expected impact of these
measures as well as their economic and financial aspects.”
Ongoing Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna,
Bangladesh
Delta Plan “The Delta Plan will integrate planning from delta-related sectors and from all across the country to come to
a holistic plan for the Bangladesh Delta. The Delta Plan will be grounded in a long-term vision of the Delta's
future. This long-term vision, combined with the use of scenarios, allows planning to be adaptive and
dynamic by constantly taking into account uncertainties in future developments.” (http://www.
bandudeltas.org/about/bangladesh-delta-plan-2100-bdp2100/, visited 14-4-2015)
4 Deltares (2014) Adaptive Delta Management, see https://www.deltares.nl/
app/uploads/2014/11/Brochure-Adaptive-Delta-Management.pdf.
5 Merchand and Ludwig (2014) Towards a Comprehensive Framework for
Adaptive Delta Management, Delta Alliance, see http://www.delta-alliance.
org/media/default.aspx/emma/org/10848051/Towards+a+Comprehensive
+Framework+for+Adaptive+Delta+Management.pdf.
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By referring to the Dutch approach as Adaptive Delta Management
the approach was stripped from its origin. It is the perceived export
potential that turned Dutch dealings with its delta into an Adaptive
Delta Management ‘package.’ The interviewee involved in the
Bangladesh delta plan explained this in the following way:
F: “well, it has been used here [in the Netherlands], partially, for the
Delta plan, but not fully, like it is being done now [in Bangladesh] in
a, well, scientific way. It originates originally from the UK. […] they
wanted to do something with it in Vietnam, but in the end that turned
more into something under the label of adaptive, or flexible. Not much
more than that. And now we try to do it rather seriously” (Interview
F, 5 March 2015).
It was thus through its export to Bangladesh that an apparently more
stringent and systematic methodology was invented – a packaging – to
characterize the Dutch approach, in the process also universalizing it. This
does not mean that the resulting adaptation pathways, or related delta sce-
narios, were produced in isolation. Rather, the scenarios for the Bangladesh
Delta plan were produced in workshops, in which Dutch experts facilitated
discussions among Bengali experts to identify relevant external drivers.
In Bangladesh, the development of delta scenarios in workshops
happened differently than in the Netherlands and Vietnam, where the
delta scenarios formed an input for the delta planning process. In the case
of Vietnam, the establishment of the future was significantly shaped by
the evaluative capacities of the (Dutch) experts that happened to be
around the table in a hotel garden, in the early stages of the process. In
the case of Bangladesh, the process of creating buy-in and enthusiasm for
the delta planning process followed a specific workshop tradition:
In Bangladesh you need to send out invitations hierarchically. The
team leader needs to send a card to the deputy project leader, from
the Bangladeshi side, thus the government of Bangladesh, who then
send invitations. When this person has signed, everybody will come.
When of course a proper DSA (Daily Subsistence Allowance, fi-
nancial compensation) is provided. […] And a lunch. These are
seemingly banal boundary conditions that [in the BGD context] are
in fact crucial for attracting people (Interview F, 5 March 2015).
Thus to create support for the Dutch Delta planning process, it had to
be made to fit with Bangladeshi bureaucratic (or perhaps development
cooperation and technical assistance) culture. The purpose of the work-
shops importantly consisted of the Bangladeshis becoming acquainted
with and convinced of the need for the Dutch way of doing deltas.
Such work of mobilizing support for Dutch delta expertise also
happened in the Vietnamese context. Institutionally, the Mekong Delta
plan initiative was linked to the Vietnamese Ministry of Environment
(MONRE), a historical spin-off of the much larger and powerful
Ministry of Agriculture (MARD).
MARD deals with land use, MARD deals with water, MONRE makes
choices about climate scenario a, b, or c. [laughs] […] you need to
find your support where the most needs to change […] The people
involved in the early stages of the Mekong Delta plan process were
too much oriented to the Netherlands (Interview G, 18 March 2015.)
This quote suggests that deltas, and delta planning processes, are not
simply packaged to travel from Netherlands to elsewhere, but happen or
come about through the skillful maneuvers of traveling delta planners
who need to create demand for a product – Dutch Delta Planning – that is
partly invented in the process. The deltas that are planned for look si-
milar, but are also very different. In Bangladesh and the Netherlands, the
planning process emphasized deltas as water systems, whereas in the
Vietnamese Mekong delta planning process the delta became defined as
the interplay between economic development and the water system.
3.2. Enacting a delta through its futures
One important way in which delta planning processes differently
enact deltas is in how they approach the question of futures. Where the
Netherlands and Bangladesh labeled the developments they took into
consideration as autonomous, the Vietnamese plan deliberately focused
on futures that could be influenced by policy. The term autonomous
development here refers to those changes that are expected to occur, or
are likely to happen, almost irrespective of country policies. These are,
in other words, changes that come from ‘outside’ the delta that the delta
needs to somehow deal with or accommodate. Examples include rising
sea levels and upstream dam development.
Comparing the process in the Netherlands to the process in Vietnam,
a senior engineer involved in both the Dutch and Vietnamese delta
planning processes observed:
What I do see, is that it has grown in a certain direction. In Vietnam,
the Mekong Delta, there is a much larger gradient of developments
to come. The point where the Mekong delta is at the moment,
compared to the Netherlands, in terms of spatial organization, is
very different. In our case [the Netherlands] the spatial layout is the
consequence of maybe a 1000 years of dealing with the system. And
there [Vietnam] it […] is much shorter. For that reason I think we
have paid much more attention [in Vietnam] to the exploration of
what directions it might go. In our case many choices have been
made, and have led to infrastructures that have influence the de-
velopment of the land use (Interview E, 19 February 2015).
Futures are about times yet to come, however, they are also informed
by narratives about the deltas’ socio-environmental histories. As the travel
of delta expertise demands some comparability of deltas, the suggestion
that deltas follow similar evolutions or development pathways is a useful
device to bring different delta ‘times’ in sync with each other.
Here, “scenario thinking” became instrumental. Indeed, a key mo-
ment in the Mekong Delta process was the translation of the idea of
scenarios to the circles of Vietnamese experts. The Dutch specialist
articulated the point as follows:
If you ask me, when did the penny drop in Vietnam? This was when
we had a good meeting in Vietnam, with people that understood
what scenario thinking meant. They could also explain to the
Vietnamese agricultural sector and Vietnamese civil engineers: this
is real! If we continue like this we will end up in rice-poverty
(Interview G, 18 March 2015).
The emphasis on scenarios was confirmed by another Dutch
member of the Mekong Delta plan project, who explained that the level
of ‘strategic thinking’ was not understood by the Vietnamese counter-
parts who assumed that the plan would become a master plan:
“From the start I’ve said that if we call it a plan, the Vietnamese will
have a complete different interpretation of it. […] they expect a
railroad timetable like plan. They looked at us like: Plan? What
plan? Man, you’re talking in vague terms. What are the deliverables?
And when do we have to deliver? And well, we just don’t know. It
took us over a year to adjust our ideas and their expectations of the
plan.” (Interview C, 25 January 2013)
As was shown in Table 2, each planning process developed its own
specific objectives – and its own specific delta. Combined with the
differences in socio-environmental histories, knowledge frameworks,
and engineering and organizational cultures, in each country this led to
altogether different delta planning trajectories and plans: Adaptive
Delta Management in Bangladesh and the Netherlands and provocative
and agenda setting delta planning in Vietnam. One of the members of
the Mekong Delta plan team compared the Mekong and Dutch planning
processes, emphasizing the strength of the former:
What I really liked [about the Mekong DP process] is that we ana-
lyzed how the economy works, what does it do? What are the ele-
ments that influence each other? And how can we change that in a
positive way?, […] but also, what does this mean for my water
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situation? […] I find that one of the major weaknesses of the Dutch
Delta Programme, that does not include a vision on how the
Netherlands will develop the coming 40 years. (Interview G, 18
March 2015)
As these differences suggest, deltas are as much the effect of different
planning cultures, trajectories and objectives, as they are their cause.
Aiming to “contribute to realizing and maintaining a prosperous delta, both
economically and socially […] and well adapted to changes in water re-
sources and climate” (see Table 1), the Vietnamese plan deliberately de-
limited its delta as an object within the reach of intervention of policies. On
the other hand, by aiming to “integrate planning from delta-related sectors
and from all across the country to come to a holistic plan for the Bangladesh
Delta,” the Bangladeshi plan enacts the delta as an object that should be
able to accommodate or deal with drivers from ‘the external world.’
Where Dutch experts were involved in facilitating the Bangladesh and
Vietnam delta planning processes, paving the way for future sales of Dutch
knowledge clearly also played a role in their considerations. During the
Workshop of the Mekong Delta Plan, the Dutch wanted to discuss one of the
first preliminary draft versions of the plan with the Vietnamese counter-
parts. It was around this time that the agro-economic scenario had come to
be the ‘preferred’ scenario. This preferred scenario was selected because
the Vietnamese counterparts demanded it. From the perspective of the
Delta planning methodology this was a surprising inconsistency. Whereas,
in deltas elsewhere, future scenarios were used to assess the robustness of
measures, in Vietnam a particular scenario was translated as the politically
preferred direction of development. When the agribusiness development
scenario was chosen as the preferred option for the development of the
Mekong delta, this caused some of the Dutch team members to speculate
over lunch about the potential for Dutch agri-business knowledge to be
exported to Vietnam. This is illustrative for the Vietnamese process, where
compared to the others, decisions where not so much based on metho-
dological concerns, but on pragmatic considerations.
In Bangladesh, in contrast, the methodology of the delta planning
process itself became the primary “export product”:
We hope to bring the Delta-plan further as a product. Of course we
also hope that the Delta plan will yield work for our [Dutch]
dredgers, or adaptive constructions, or building dikes (Interview F, 5
March 2015).
However, interviewees suggested that in Bangladesh, too, there
were less visible, or hidden, agendas: “I think there are all sorts of
motives [for the Bangladeshi parties] to use the Delta plan for short or
longer term goals. That's inevitable. You need to be aware of that.”
(Interview F, 5 March 2015)
In all cases, the way the deltas and their futures were defined was the
joint product of international relations, the accommodation of local re-
quirements and to a lesser extent trade agendas with a complicated dy-
namic of its own (Jensen and Winthereik, 2013). The Vietnamese and
Bangladeshi cases show ad hoc and rather opportunistic considerations
with regard to the identifying trade opportunities for specific sectors. Delta
planning processes, thus, involve changes of methodology and particular
choices of specific futures, shaped by local demands or opportunities.
4. Un-Dutching
In a co-evolutionary process, deltas change over time and over
place. This makes it difficult to unequivocally justify one generic delta
planning procedure, one that is anchored in a natural ‘sameness’ of
deltas. In this article we have used this difficulty as the starting point
for questioning the rationale and workings of the travels of Dutch delta
expertise to other countries.
Our analysis shows that using the term “Dutch” for qualifying a
Delta Planning Approach is above all a smart branding technique. This
branding partly took place in retrospect. “Dutch,” after all, brings to
mind the well-known and oft-repeated stories about the Dutch
conquering their waters, which have become part of the standard re-
pertoire of Dutch export and tourist pitches. Hence, Dutchness serves to
mark delta expertise as rooted in a long tradition of ever more so-
phisticated efforts to deal and live with floods. It also vaguely signals
superiority in terms of an implied evolutionary ladder of civilization, in
which other deltas can learn from the Dutch as the Dutch supposedly
have reached a more advanced and superior form of delta-ness – thanks
to its specific planning and engineering expertise.
When held against the evidence of Dutch delta planning episodes in
the 20th century, such associations crumble. For one, it proves difficult to
precisely pin-point the Dutchness – or a natural deltaic foundation, for
that matter – of delta planning approaches. The review shows that in the
Netherlands, consecutive Delta Committees and plans each defined and
thus brought into being a different delta, and thus a different Dutch-ness:
in a little over 50 years, the delta not just spatially stretched from just the
South-Western part of the Netherlands to the entire country, but also the
very flood protection philosophy changed – altering water level norms as
well as the function and definition of dikes and polders. From efforts to
keep water out, delta planning moved to efforts to bring water in – re-
creating water-based natures in the process. Particular socio material
arrangements built around ideas of control, evolved over time (the eco-
turn) into a controlled letting go (of control). This reflects a broadening
of disciplines involved in the Dutch dealings with their delta, and si-
multaneously signifies a broadening of the boundaries of the delta.
How to make such a fluid, ever-changing delta – or delta planning
process – travel? How to make it generic enough for export? Next to
using the already mentioned powerful brand of Dutchness to mark
water knowledge as superior, this also paradoxically happened through
a conscious and simultaneous process of un-Dutching: by packaging and
scientizing the Dutch delta planning approach and turning it into a
generic Adaptive Delta Management approach. Characteristic of this
approach is the active invention, introduction and use of a specific way
of relating to the future: the formulation of future scenarios.
Our interviews, analysis and workshop show that the combination of
the labels of Dutch and Adaptive Delta Management is attractive enough
to create a space for experienced Dutch experts together with knowl-
edgeable partners in other deltas (Vietnam or Bangladesh) to have useful
interactions and dialogs about opportunities for the joint development of
plans and private-public interventions to protect deltas from floods. In
this sense, the labels are doing a lot of positive work in mobilizing
creativity as well as intellectual energies and funds. At the same time, the
labels are misleading in implying and reproducing the idea that it is the
sameness of deltas and the (economic, institutional or technological)
advancement of the Dutch that makes Dutch delta knowledge useful
elsewhere. Our examples of Dutch delta planning episodes and mani-
festations in various times and spaces suggest, first of all, that deltaic
sameness is as much the outcome as the cause of interventions or plan-
ning processes. Second, maintaining a belief that Dutch delta planning
knowledge is somehow better or more advanced than delta planning
knowledges that have evolved in other countries dangerously portrays
the travel or transfer of delta planning knowledges as one-way learning
process, one in which the Dutch always figure as the teachers or experts.
Opportunities for Dutch to learn from others thus become difficult to
identify and recognize, something that becomes particularly hard to
defend when one accepts that sustainable development requires different
and new forms of knowing and dealing with nature. A co-evolutionary
definition of deltaic processes provides a potentially more symmetrical
basis for understanding the exchange of experiences between delta
countries and their experts, because it produces explanations that do not
rely on the assumed superiority of the Dutch and that are more modest in
avoiding grand theorizations or generalizations.
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